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CASE NOTES
boards the power to swiftly discharge teachers who have demonstrated
their unfitness45 through incompetence, inefficiency, insubordination, or
neglect of duty.46
Tort- ABROGATION OF PARENTAL IMMUNITY--AnderSon V. Stream, 295
N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
Parental immunity is a judicially created rule that denies minor chil-
dren a cause of action in tort against their parents.' In the last eighteen
years the doctrine has been attacked in the courts,2 resulting in a trend
toward its judicial abrogation.3 In the 1968 case ofSilesky v. Ke/man4 the
45. The Minnesota Supreme Court has not ruled on a teacher dismissal case based on
homosexuality or other possible immoral conduct charges. But ef Gish v. Board of Educ.,
145 NJ. Super. 96, 104-05, 366 A.2d 1337, 1342 (1976) (school board's interest in protect-
ing students justified dismissal of homosexual teacher); Gaylord v. Tacoma School Dist.
No. 10, 88 Wash. 2d 286, 559 P.2d 1340 (1977) (prior record of dismissed teacher irrele-
vant because of danger to students from teacher's present homosexuality); Fleming, Teacher
Dismisal for Cause. Public & Pnoat Morality, 7 J.L. & EDUC. 423 (1978).
46. The Minnesota teacher tenure statute already provides a two-step analysis for
each of these provisions. Compare MINN. STAT. § 125.12(6) (1980) with MINN. STAT.
§ 125.12(8) (1980).
1. See Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431,432-33, 161 N.W.2d 631, 632 (1968); Briere
v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 434, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966) Falco v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 376,
282 A.2d 351, 353 (1971); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411,412, 610 P.2d 891 (1980);
see also 6 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 219, 219 n. 1 (1980) (history and rationale of parent-
child tort immunity doctrine).
2. See, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963); see also 6 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 219, 221 n. 11 (listing 21 states that have abrogated parent-child tort
immunity in whole or in part). Wisconsin was one of the first jurisdictions to substantially
limit parental tort immunity.
3. Jurisdictions eliminating parent-child tort immunity have adopted four main ap-
proaches to abrogation: total abrogation, see, e.g., Peterson v. City of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii
484, 486, 462 P.2d 1007, 1008 (1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 405, 528 P.2d 1013,
1017-18 (1974); the reasonable parent standard, see, e.g., Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971) (the reasonable parent standard
recognizes a parent's prerogative and duty to exercise authority over his minor child, but
within reasonable limits); abrogation except for activities associated with family relation-
ships or objectives, see, e.g., Schenk v. Schenk, 100 Ill. App. 2d 199, 206, 241 N.E.2d 12, 15
(1968) (immunity is preserved "for conduct of either a parent or child arising out of the
family relationship and directly connected with the family purposes and objectives"); and,
abrogation with specific exceptions, see, e.g., Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122
N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963) (abrogated immunity except "(1) where the alleged negligent act
involves an exercise of parental authority over the child; and (2) where the alleged negli-
gent act act involves an exercise or ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provi-
sion of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and other care'); see also
Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 89,471 P.2d 282, 285 (1970) (discusses parental immunity
generally indicating Wisconsin standard persuasive but not specifically adopted because it
was unnecessary to decide instant case); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 8, 199 N.W.2d
169, 172-73 (1972) (adopts hybrid of Gibson and Goller, adding reasonableness to modify
parental authority in first Goiter exception).
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Minnesota Supreme Court substantially limited the doctrine of parental
immunity by recognizing it only when the parent was exercising reason-
able authority over the child or when the parent was providing for the
child's physical needs. 5 In Anderson v. Stream,3 the Minnesota Supreme
Court totally abolished the doctrine of parental immunity and became
the second jurisdiction to adopt the reasonable parent standard for par-
ent-child negligence cases.
7
In Anderson the defendants lived next door to the plaintiffs and both
families shared a common driveway. On the day of the accident, the
plaintiff, a twenty-three-month-old child, was playing outdoors while her
parents remained inside.8 About ten to fifteen minutes after she had
begun to play the child was injured when the defendant backed her car
4. 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968).
5. See id at 442, 161 N.W.2d at 638. The Silesky court adopted a hybrid of two of
the previously enunciated approaches to abrogation of parent-child tort immunity. Id
The court essentially adopted the exceptions to parent-child immunity delineated by the
Wisconsin court in Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 413, 122 N.W.2d 193, 198 (1963).
However, the Minnesota court added the word "reasonable" to the first exception con-
cerning the use of parental authority creating a standard similar to the reasonable parent
standard adopted by the California Supreme Court in Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914,
921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971). See Comment, The "Reasonable
Parent" Standard" An Alternative to Parent-Child Tort Immunit, 47 U. COLO. L. REv. 795, 811
(1976).
The S~iesky exceptions have been applied in three Minnesota cases. See Bell v.
Schwartz, 422 F. Supp. 257, 259 (D. Minn. 1976); Ourada v. Knahmuhs, 301 Minn. 131,
133, 221 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1974); Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 95, 203 N.W.2d 352,
353 (1972).
Bell involved negligent parental supervision. Since the Minnesota Supreme Court
had not addressed the issue of negligent parental supervision of children, the Federal Dis-
trict Court was forced to predict what the Minnesota court would decide. The Federal
District Court concluded that negligent parental supervision came within the purview of
the first Stesky exception regarding parental authority. In Ourada, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found that a father's failure to maintain a stairway came within the
second Silesky exception regarding parental discretion with respect to housing. In Cherry
the Minnesota court found that parental negligence allowing an infant to place an electri-
cal extension cord in her mouth came within the second Stiesky exception.
6. 295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980). Anderson was consolidated for appeal with the case
of Nuessle v. Nuessle. In Nuessle the plaintiff, a three-year-old boy, accompanied his father
on an errand to a drugstore. The father entered the drugstore and after 10 to 15 seconds
noticed his son was not with him. After looking briefly in the store, the father saw his son
crossing the street. The father hurried outside and yelled to his son. The child turned
toward his father and recrossed the street. The child was struck by an automobile and
sustained serious injuries. An action was commenced by plaintiff's mother as guardian ad
litem for damages against the father. Defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the parental immunity doctrine barred his son's claims. The trial court
granted the motion, ruling that the first Silesy exception was applicable. On appeal, the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed both Anderson and Nuessle for retrial.
7. 295 N.W.2d at 601.
8. Id at 596. The child asked her parents if she could play outside. The parents
acquiesced and instructed the child to stay in the back yard.
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over the child's leg. 9 After the accident the child was found sitting par-
tially on the defendants' grass and partially on the part of the driveway
closest to the defendants' house. 10 Plaintiff's father, as guardian for his
minor daughter and in an individual capacity, brought an action for the
damages resulting from the child's injury." Defendants impleaded the
child's parents for contribution and indemnity. The parents moved for
summary judgment on the third-party complaint, claiming they were
immune from liability.' 2 The district court dismissed the third-party
complaint on the ground that the parents were immune from claims
brought by their children.' 3
The preliminary issue in Anderson was whether the Silesky exceptions to
the abrogation of parent-child immunity should be retained.' 4 These ex-
ceptions preserved parental immunity "(1) where the alleged negligent
act involves an exercise of reasonable parental authority over the child;
and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves an exercise of ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of food, clothing, hous-
ing, medical and dental services, and other care."' 5
Because the precise scope of the Silesky exceptions was not clear, the
Anderson court believed that the application of the exceptions allowed for
too much discretion.' 6 Furthermore, the possibility of broadly varying
9. Id Before the child was injured she was observed twice by her mother. The first
time the child was playing by the back step. The second time the child had moved to-
wards the front of the house.
10. Id
11. Id
12. Id. An essential element for contribution in a tort action is a common liability of
joint tort-feasors to an injured party. "Common liability exists if two defendents are inde-
pendently liable to the plaintiff for the same damages." Johnson v. Serra, 521 F.2d 1289,
1297 (8th Cir. 1975); see, e.g., Hart v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 276 N.W.2d 166, 168 (Minn.
1979); Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., 114, 122-27, 257 N.W.2d 679, 685-88 (1977).
13. 295 N.W.2d at 596-97. The district court held that the parent's negligent supervi-
sion fell within the Si'esky exceptions. See Brief for Appellant at A-12, Anderson v. Stream,
295 N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980).
14. 295 N.W.2d at 596. A number of other issues were raised on appeal. Those issues
included whether the parent's conduct constituted an "affirmative act of negligence",
whether the parent's conduct involved parental supervision, whether parental supervision
qualified as an exercise of "parental authority" under the first Slesky exception, and, solely
in regard to the Anderson appeal, whether the parent's alleged act involved an exercise of
parental discretion with respect to the provision of housing under the second Stiesky excep-
tion. Id. at 597. After adopting the reasonable parent standard, the court found it unnec-
essary to decide these issues. The issues raised but not decided are indicative of the
difficulties in applying the St'lesky exceptions. See, e.g., infta note 16.
15. Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968).
16. Id at 598. The type of arbitrary distinction which the Anderson court referred to
can be found by looking at five decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in applying the
second Goller exception from which the Silesky exceptions were derived. In Lemmen v.
Servais, 39 Wis. 2d 75, 158 N.W.2d 341 (1968), the Wisconsin court was faced with the
question, whether a parent's failure to instruct his child about safety procedures for de-
parting from a school bus constituted an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
1982]
3
et al.: Torts—Abrogation of Parental Immunity—Anderson v. Stream, 295 N.W
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1982
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW[
interpretations of the terms "reasonable" and "ordinary," as used in the
Si/esy exceptions, concerned the court. 17 The Anderson court reasoned
that a literal interpretation of both terms could mean that a parent was
immune from liability only in circumstances where he was not negligent,
clearly contrary to the intention of the Silesky court. 18 The Anderson court
concluded that the Silesky exceptions were "not very helpful"19 and cre-
ated "the potential for arbitrary decisionmaking in the area."20
The Anderson court stated that the weaknesses associated with the
Silesky exceptions are overcome by adoption of the reasonable parent
standard: "What would an ordinarily reasonable and prudent parent
have done in similar circumstances?"21 The reasonable parent standard
allows the parent discretion in exercising his parental duties, but avoids
respect to "other care." The court concluded that the parents were immune. Three other
Wisconsin cases involved alleged parental negligence in the failure to supervise a child
outside of the home. In each case the court held that parental supervision of a child's play
did not constitute an exercise of parental discretion with respect to "other care." See
Howes v. Hansen, 56 Wis. 2d 247, 201 N.W.2d 825 (1972) (mother held liable for negli-
gent supervision of child by permitting him to wander into front yard where he was in-
jured by power mower); Thoreson v. Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Co., 56 Wis. 2d 231,
201 N.W.2d 745 (1972) (two-year-old child left alone in living room by mother wandered
into street where he was struck by bus); Cole v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 47 Wis. 2d 629, 177
N.W.2d 866 (1970) (parent liable for failure to supervise child on swing set). The need to
engage in fine line-drawing that is imposed by the exceptions is revealed by Thomas v.
Kells, 53 Wis. 2d 141, 191 N.W.2d 872 (1971). In Thomas the child fell down a staircase at
the rear of the family home. The crucial question, unresolved by the court because of a
lack of essential facts, was whether the stairway was part of the family's home. If the
stairway was found to be within the family domicile, parental immunity would apply
because supervision of the child would be an exercise of ordinary parental discretion with
respect to the provision of "housing." The case was remanded for determination of
whether the stairway was part of the father's home. The exception involving ordinary
parental discretion with respect to the provision of "housing" has been considered by the
Minnesota Supreme Court. See Cherry v. Cherry, 295 Minn. 93, 203 N.W.2d 352 (1972).
Michigan has taken a different approach regarding parental supervision of children.
The Michigan Supreme Court adopted the Goller exceptions to the abrogation of parental
immunity in Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972). In Paige v. Bing
Constr. Co., 61 Mich. App. 480, 484, 233 N.W.2d 46, 48 (1975), the Michigan Court of
Appeals held that parental supervision was within the exercise of reasonable parental au-
thority over the child.
17. 295 N.W.2d at 598.
18. Id The court reasoned that the first exception would not preclude liability if the
parent acted "unreasonably" in exercising his parental authority. This construction
would be co-extensive with the conclusion that the parent was negligent. Thus, "a literal
interpretation of the modifier 'reasonable' would mean that a parent is immune from
liability only in situations where he is non-negligent in exercising his parental authority.
This result. . . would provide no real immunity and thus makes a sham of the first excep-
tion." Id The use of the term "ordinary" in the second exception creates a similar prob-
lem. Id
19. Id
20. Id;seealo Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr.
288, 293 (1971) (Goler view would result in drawing of arbitrary distinctions).
21. 295 N.W.2d at 598 (emphasis omitted).
[Vol. 8
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the interpretive problems associated with the Silesky exceptions.22 The
court viewed the reasonable parent standard as advancing the public
policy interest of affording a right for a wrong.23 In addition the reason-
able parent standard places responsibility on and allows contribution
from persons engaging in unreasonable injury-causing conduct.
24
Another factor that influenced the court's decision is the prevalence of
liability insurance.25, The Anderson court believed that the wide-spread
presence of homeowner's and renter's liability insurance, even though
not statutorily mandated, was an important characteristic of modern so-
ciety 26 that would help effectuate the court's objective of compensation
for injured children.2
7
The crucial question before the Anderson court was whether or not pa-
rental authority and discretion could be effectively protected by the rea-
sonable parent standard. 28 In considering this question, the Minnesota
court looked to California, the first state to adopt the reasonable parent
standard. In the 1971 case of Gtbson v. Gbson29 the California Supreme
22. Id at 599; see also Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921-22, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92
Cal. Rptr. 288, 293 (1971); Note, The Parent-Child Tort Immunity Law in Massachusetts, 12
NEw ENG. L. REv. 309, 331-32 (1976); Comment, The Demise of Parent-Child Tort Immunity,
12 WILLAMETTE L.J. 605, 617-18 (1976).
23. 295 N.W.2d at 600.
24. Id
25. Id
26. Id; see also Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 442, 161 N.W.2d 631, 638 (1968);
Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 435, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H.
314, 317-18, 211 A.2d 410, 413 (1965); Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 412, 122 N.W.2d
193, 197 (1963). The existence of liability insurance has been viewed by some courts as
removing a possible disruption of family harmony. See, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15
(Alaska 1967); Dean v. Smith, 106 N.H. 314, 318, 211 A.2d 410, 413 (1965); Gelbman v.
Gelbman, 23 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 245 N.E.2d 192, 193-94, 297 N.Y.S.2d 529, 531-32 (1969).
27. 295 N.W.2d at 600.
28. Id at 598. The Anderson court did not reject the underlying rationale of Silesky
insofar as the maintenance of parental discretion and discipline were concerned, but
rather objected to the fact that Silesky immunized all parental actions falling within the
scope of the two exceptions. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the reasonable parent
standard would avoid the interpretive pitfalls associated with the Silesky exceptions. Id. at
599; see also Article, The Vesiiges of Child-Parent Tort Immunity, 6 U.C.D. L. REv. 195, 202-04
(1973); Note, Gibson v. Gibson: A Further Limitation on Califormia's Parent-Child Immunity
Rule, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 588, 594 (1972).
29. 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971). In Gibson a father in-
structed his 10-year-old son to enter a roadway to correct the wheels ofajeep being towed
by the father. While following the directions, the son was struck by another vehicle. The
Gibson court refused to adopt the Goller exceptions and instead adopted the "reasonable
parent" standard as a means of abrogating parental immunity. Id at 921, 479 P.2d at
653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293. Since the court's adoption of the "reasonable parent" standard
in 1971, the standard has remained unchallenged in California. In fact, Gibson has been
cited by the California courts as favoring abrogation of common-law tort rules in which
the underlying policy considerations for the rule no long exist. See, e.g., Bernhard v. Har-
rah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976) (extending abrogation
of liquor liability); Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 115
19821
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Court held that a minor child could maintain an action for negligence
against his parent and that the test for parental conduct would be one of
reasonableness in light of of the parental role.3o The plaintiff in Gibson
was a minor who brought suit against his father to recover damages re-
sulting from the father's negligence.31 The Gibson court first analyzed the
problems that might arise from abrogation of parent-child immunity.
32
The court recognized that the parent-child relationship is unique and
that the traditional concepts of negligence cannot be applied blindly.
33
The Gibson court nevertheless chose not to follow jurisdictions that had
retained parental immunity in some limited form. Exceptions to total
abrogation were viewed as giving the parent "carte blanche" to act negli-
gently toward his child.34 Therefore, the Gibson court established the rea-
sonable parent standard as the proper test for parental conduct. 35 The
same reasoning was used by the Anderson court to support its adoption of
the reasonable parent standard.
36
The dissenting justices in Anderson objected to the reasonable parent
standard because of juror bias resulting from the personal experiences of
jurors as parents and children. 37 Jurors arguably would substitute their
own views of proper child-rearing practices for the law. 38 The dissent
also thought the application of the reasonable parent standard would
invade family privacy because third parties could implead parents on
Cal. Rptr. 765 (1974) (recognizing wife's action for loss of consortium); Brown v. Merlo, 8
Cal. 3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 106 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1973) (abolishing California's guest stat-
ute); Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971) (partial abro-
gation of liquor liability tort rule); Brockett v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Co., 264 Cal. App. 2d
69, 70 Cal. Rptr. 136 (1968) (allowed third party recovery against a non-commercial li-
quor server).
30. 3 Cal. 3d at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
31. Id at 916, 479 P.2d at 648-49, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 288-89.
32. Id at 919-21, 479 P.2d at 651-52, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 290-93. The Gibson court dis-
cussed the traditional arguments advanced for the parental immunity rule, such as danger
to family harmony, fear of collusion and fraud, and threats to parental authority. The
only argument that the court found to be valid was the threat to parental authority. Id at
920, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
33. Id at 921, 479 P.2d at 652, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292.
34. Id, 479 P.2d at 652-53, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 292-93. The Gibson court recognized that
the parent-child relationship was unique and that traditional concepts of negligence could
not be blindly applied. However, the court reasoned that the implication of Goller would
allow the parent to act negligently toward his child without liability if the parental con-
duct fell within the scope of the exceptions. The Gibson court observed, "although a par-
ent has the prerogative and the duty to exercise authority over his minor child, this
prerogative must be exercised within reasonable limits. The standards to be applied is the
traditional one of reasonableness, but viewed in light of the parental role." Id, 479 P.2d
at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
35. See id at 921, 479 P.2d at 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
36. 295 N.W.2d at 598-99.
37. Id at 602 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting). The dissent reasoned that most jurors have
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claims of parental negligence. 39 Moreover, since neither homeowner's or
renter's insurance is compulsory, the dissent contended that the lack of
insurance would deter a child from suing an uninsured parent. 40 Even if
a child of an uninsured parent did sue a third party and the parent was
held liable for contribution, "family strife" would result. 4 1
An appropriate standard of care for parent-child relations must bal-
ance the parent's interests of control and discipline against the child's
right to have a remedy for injury negligently inflicted by the parent.
42
The reasonable parent standard achieves this balance by allowing par-
ents to exercise discipline and control over the child, but only to the ex-
tent that it is reasonable.43 The parent is held to a standard of
reasonableness regardless of the nature of his activity, thereby eliminat-
ing the arbitrary division between immunity and liability that existed
under the Si/esky exceptions. 44 Unlike the Silesky exceptions, the reason-
able parent standard does not give the parent a "right" to neglect any of
his duties.45 More importantly, the child's right to recover for a negli-
gently inflicted injury is protected without sacrificing parental discretion
in child rearing.46
The standard of reasonable parental conduct allows parents to be oc-
casionally forgetful, careless, or strict without crossing the bounds of
"reasonable" behavior.4 7 The reasonable parent standard allows a case-
by-case determination of meritorious claims rather than a categorical ex-
39. Id at 603.
40. Id
41. Id
42. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288 (1971) (rec-
ognized need for parental discretion in exercising discipline over child but only within
reasonable limits); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 360 Mass. 350, 339 N.E.2d 907 (1975) (limited
abrogation of parental immunity to automobile accidents because such actions did not
undermine parental authority and discipline); Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d
149 (1952) (recovery allowed for tort committed by parent while dealing with child in
non-parent transaction).
43. See Comment, Parental Immunity." Caforma's Answer, 8 IDAHo L. REV. 179, 185
(1971) [hereinafter cited as Caifornia's Answer]; Comment, supra note 5, at 809; Comment,
Parent Immunity: The Casefor Abrogation of Parental Immuniy in Florida, 25 U. FLA. L. REV.
794, 801 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Parental Immunity].
44. See Comment, Caifornia's Answer, supra note 43, at 186; Comment, supra note 5, at
809; Comment, Parental Immunity, supra note 43, at 801; Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immu-
nity. A Rule in Need of Change, 27 U. MIAMI L. REv. 191, 206 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity].
45. See Comment, Parent-Child Immunity in Oklahoma. Some Considerationsfor Abandoning
the Total Immunity Shield, 12 TULSA L.J. 545, 553 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Parent-Child Immunity in Oklahoma]; Comment, supra note 5, at 809.
46. See Note, supra note 22 at 332; Comment, supra note 5, at 809. But see Article,
supra note 28, at 215 (reasonable parent standard may expose parent to liability when he
should be immune).
47. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 921, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
292 (1971); Note, supra note 22, at 331; Comment, supra note 5, at 809-10.
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clusion of some classes of tort actions regardless of the parent's negligent
conduct.
48
The Anderson dissenters' fears of the undue influence of juror bias is not
compelling. There is no way to remove a juror's values and attitudes
from the fact-finding process.49 The law recognizes this problem and
provides safeguards. The jury is a random cross-section of the commu-
nity, assuring an adequate representation of diverse community values.50
Persons with strong prejudices can be removed from the jury panel dur-
ing voir dire.5 1
The prevalence of homeowner's and renter's liability insurance is a
factor in favor of the adoption of the reasonable parent standard. 52 The
negligent parent often controls the decision to bring suit against a non-
parent defendant. 53 Thus, the uninsured or underinsured parent may be
inclined to avoid suit against a non-parent defendant out of fear of third-
party liability.54 But lack of insurance does not necessarily chill the in-
centive to sue. A parent may be partially liable as a third-party defend-
ant and still wish to hold the non-parent defendant liable.55 Even if the
parent is ultimately held liable for contribution, no more family strife or
economic deprivation would occur than if the non-parent defendant
were to sue an uninsured parent. In such situations the children may
suffer economic deprivation, but the parent would not be granted immu-
nity.56 Moreover, since insurance is readily available, decisions that im-
48. See Comment, supra note 5, at 809.
49. See Zeisel, The Amer'anJu y, Annual ChtiefJustice Earl Warren Conference on Advocacy in
the US (June 24-25, 1977). Zeisel also points out that in criminal and civil cases the
disagreement rate between the judge and the jury is about 20%, which is within reason-
able limits. This would indicate that the jury understands the case before it, and injects a
sense of justice from the community.
50. Id at 88.
51. Id
52. See Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 922, 479 P.2d 648, 653, 92 Cal. Rptr. 288,
293 (1971). See supra note 26 and cases cited therein. But see State Farm Homeowner's Policy,
section II Exclusions l(g) at 10 (1977) (on file at William Mitchell Law Review office).
The insurance policy exclusion states that personal liability and medical payments do not
apply to the insured, or to any other person under the age of 21 who is in the care of the
insured. Id The validity of the exclusion has not been litigated. However, since the
exclusion is in direct conflict with the underlying rationale for the abrogation of parent-
child tort immunity, the prevalence of homeowner's insurance and the desire to compen-
sate the child for an injury; the court is not likely to uphold the conclusion.
53. See Streenz v. Streenz, 106 Ariz. 86, 90, 471 P.2d 282, 286 (1970) (McFarland, J.,
dissenting); Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 435, 224 A.2d 588, 590 (1966).
54. See 295 N..W.2d at 603 (Rogosheske, J., dissenting); Note, supra note 28, at 600-02.
55. See Holodook v. Spencer, 36 N.Y.2d 35, 52-53, 324 N.E.2d 338, 347, 364 N.Y.S.2d
859, 873 (1974) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
Even if the parent is liable for contribution, there still may be a net gain in family
finances because of the percentage of recovery from the third-party defendant.
56. See Borst v. Borst, 41 Wash. 2d 642, 251 P.2d 149.(1952). The Borst court stated:
It may also be observed that, in a particular case, there may be no other
children, or the family resources may be such that recovery of judgment will in
[Vol. 8
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CASE NOTES
pose liability may induce uninsured persons to purchase homeowner's or
renter's insurance.
5 7
The Minnesota Supreme Court is the first court to follow California in
adopting the reasonable parent standard. The reluctance of other courts
to adopt the reasonable parent standard is partly due to an inability to
predict the consequences of the standard. Courts that have considered
the standard have expressed fear over the potential loss-of discretion in
child rearing and the impracticality of imposing diverse religious, ethnic,
and cultural values on matters of child rearing.58 Furthermore, the Gib-
son court did not specify the quantum of negligence which would be re-
quired to find a parent liable.59
The Anderson court adopted the guidelines for application of the rea-
sonable parent standard established by Justice Fuchsberg in his concur-
ring opinion in Noechek v. Gesuale.60 The test of a parent's conduct is
based on all the relevant facts and circumstances, taking into account the
parent-child relationship; the practical responsibilities, expectations and
limitations that flow from the relationship; and the judgmental nature of
the decisions a parent must make. The age, mental and physical health
of the child, the intelligence, aptitudes and needs of the child, the pres-
ence of other children in the family and various other social, physical,
and economic factors also should be considered. 6 1 In a case involving
supervision of a child, the parent would be liable only if the accident
could have been prevented by closer supervision and if it would have
no sense prejudice the interests of other children. In our opinion, this argument
has no more validity in the case of suits between parent and child than where the
parent is sued by a stranger. In the latter case the parent's children may be
financially prejudiced, but this does not immunize the parent.
Id at 652, 251 P.2d at 154.
57. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, § 122, at 868 (4th ed.
1971). Prosser, discussing the prevalence of liability insurance as a factor to be considered
in abrogation of the parent-child immunity, stated that "[m]ost of the courts which have
mentioned that matter at all, instead of deciding the question as one of policy, have gone
off the narrow technical ground that liability insurance does not create liability." Id
58. See Comment, supra note 22, see, e.g., Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682, 684 (Del.
1979) (adoption of reasonable parent standard advocated but court fears standard would
circumscribe wide range of discretion required in child-rearing); Pedigo v. Rowley, 101
Idaho 201, 205, 610 P.2d 560, 564 (1980) (diversity in religious, ethnic and cultural back-
grounds of Idaho population would make reasonable parent standard inapplicable); Black
v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634, 639-40 (Me. 1979) (limited abrogation of parental immunity to
automobile negligence cases because concepts of parental immunity should be delineated
on a case-by-case basis); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 Wash. 2d 411, 416, 610 P.2d 891, 893
(Wash. 1980) (parental authority and discipline should not lead to liability in certain
situations; development of any immunity should be done on case-by-case basis).
59. See Article, supra note 28 at 203; Note, supra note 28, at 593.
60. 46 N.Y.2d 332, 347, 385 N.E.2d 1268, 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 349-50 (1978).
Judge Fuchsberg's guidelines refer to negligent parental supervision but are applicable to
negligent parental acts.
61. 295 N.W.2d at 599 (quoting Nolechek v. Gesuale, 46 N.Y.2d 332, 346, 385 N.E.2d
1268, 1277, 413 N.Y.S.2d 340, 349 (1978)).
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been reasonable for the parent to have supervised the child more
closely. 62 The reasonable parent standard does not require that a parent
be subjected to liability for every mistake. Only parental conduct that
transgresses the bounds of "reasonableness" gives rise to tort liability.
63
The reasonable parent standard adopted by the Minnesota Supreme
Court eliminates the inequity that non-parent defendants suffered under
the Silesky exceptions.64 If two or more persons are jointly liable for an
injury inflicted on another, contribution for damages should be in direct
proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each regardless of
intrafamilial relationships. 65 The reasonable parent standard ade-
62. See Comment, supra note 5, at 812.
63. Id at 810-11.
64. The "reasonable parent" standard has been preferred by many commentators as
the best approach to abrogation of parent-child tort immunity. See Ingram & Barder, The
Decline of the Doctrine of Parent-Child Tort Immunity 68 ILL. B.J. 596, 601 (1980) (found rea-
sonable parent standard to be most fair and workable); Note, supra note 28, at 603 (reason-
able parent standard may be best approach to abrogation of parental immunity);
Comment, California's Answer, supra note 43, at 187 (reasonable parent approach advocated
for Idaho); Note, supra note 22, at 331-32 (reasonable parent approach advocated for Mas-
sachusetts); Comment, Parent-ChildImmunity in Oklahoma, supra note 45, at 555 (reasonable
parent advocated for Oklahoma); Comment, supra note 5, at 816-17 (advocating reason-
able parent standard as best way to abrogate parent-child tort immunity); Comment, Pa-
rental Immunity, supra note 43, at 802 (reasonable prudent parent test advocated for
Florida); Comment, Parent-Child Tort Immunity, supra note 44, at 206-07 (reasonable parent
standard advocated for Florida); Comment, supra note 22, at 618 (reasonable parent stan-
dard preferable to Goller exceptions).
65. See MINN. STAT. §§ 604.01-.02 (1980). In Minnesota contributory fault will not
bar recovery in an action by any person, if the contributory fault is not greater than the
fault of the person against whom recovery is sought. Id § 604.01. Minn. Stat. § 604.02(1)
(1980) reads as follows: "When two or more persons are jointly liable, contributions to
awards shall be in proportion to the percentage of fault attributable to each, except that
each is jointly and severally liable for the whole award." In an action brought by a child
against a non-parent defendant for negligence, where the non-parent defendant impleads
the parent, the court or jury must determine the percentage of fault attributable to each.
If the parent is found to be 40% at fault and the non-parent is found to be 60% at fault,
each would have to contribute their proportion of the award. Thus, if the child is
awarded $100,000 for damages, the parent would be liable for $40,000 and the non-parent
defendant would be liable for $60,000.
In addition, a non-parent third-party may implead the parent for negligent conduct
resulting in an injury to a child, and if the parent is found negligent, the parent would be
liable for his proportion of contribution to the award. Id § 604.02. Under Silesky even if a
parent fell within one of the exceptions, thereby becoming immune, his negligence must
still be considered to determine the percentage of fault of the non-immune defendant. Cf
Connar v. West Shore Equip. of Milwaukee, Inc., 68 Wis. 2d 42, 45, 227 N.W.2d 660, 662
(1975) (immaterial that corporation is not party or is immune from further liability since
apportionment of negligence must include all whose negligence may have contributed to
cause of action); Payne v. Bilco Co., 54 Wis. 2d 424, 431-32, 195 N.W.2d 641, 646 (1972)
(required apportionment of negligence for all tort-feasor); Pierringer v. Hoger, 21 Wis. 2d
182, 191-92, 124 N.W.2d 106, 112 (1963) (percentage of causal negligence of nonsettling
tort-feasor must be determined by proper allocation of all causal negligence of all joint
tort-feasors and of plaintiff if contributorily negligent). Since the parent would be im-
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